Cripps, M.W.;
(1997)
Bargaining and the timing of investment.
International Economic Review
, 38
(3)
pp. 527-546.
![[thumbnail of 16386.pdf]](https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png) Preview |
PDF
16386.pdf Download (102kB) |
Abstract
The joint determination of the timing of investment and wage bargaining is modelled. Two cases are considered: (a) There is an alternating-offer bargaining game over binding wage contracts and production is possible only when agreement is reached. (b) There are no binding contracts so revenue is divided in period-by-period bargaining post-investment. Investment can occur earlier in case (b) than in case (a) and the equilibrium in case (b) can Pareto-dominate the equilibrium with binding contracts. These conclusions depend on players' discount factors.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Bargaining and the timing of investment |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://www.jstor.org/stable/info/2527279 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com. The online version is available via JSTOR subscription |
| UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/16386 |
Archive Staff Only
 |
View Item |
