Bohnet, I.;
Harmgart, H.;
Huck, S.;
Tyran, J.-R.;
(2005)
Learning trust.
Journal of the European Economic Association
, 3
(2-3)
pp. 322-329.
10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.322.
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Abstract
We examine the effects of different forms of feedback information on the performance of markets that suffer from moral hazard problems due to sequential exchange. As orthodox theory would predict, we find that providing buyers with information about sellers' trading history boosts market performance. More surprisingly, this beneficial effect of incentives for reputation building is considerably enhanced if sellers, too, can observe other sellers' trading history. This suggests that two-sided market transparency is an important ingredient for the design of well-functioning markets that are prone to moral hazard.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Learning trust |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.322 |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.322 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Copyright Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press |
| UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/16578 |
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