Jehiel, P.;
(2010)
On transparency in organizations.
(ELSE Working Papers
371).
ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
Non-transparency both in the form of incomplete information disclosure and in the form of coarse feedback disclosure is optimal in virtual all organizational arrangements of interest. Speci�cally, in moral hazard interactions, some form of non-transparency is always desirable, as soon as the dimensionality of the problem exceeds the dimensionality of the action spaces of the various agents.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | On transparency in organizations |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2010 |
| Language: | English |
| UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/19477 |
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