Besley, T.;
Preston, I.;
(2007)
Electoral bias and policy choice: theory and evidence.
(IFS Working Papers
W07/06).
Institute for Fiscal Studies: London, UK.
![[thumbnail of 2630.pdf]](https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png) Preview |
PDF
2630.pdf Download (587kB) |
Abstract
This paper develops an approach to studying how bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of electoral districting affects policy choice. We tie a commonly used measure of electoral bias to the theory of party competition and show how this affects party strategy in theory. The usefulness of the approach is illustrated using data on local government in England. The results suggest that reducing electoral bias leads parties to moderate their policies.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | Electoral bias and policy choice: theory and evidence |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/browse/type/wp |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | Forthcoming publication in Quarterly Journal of Economics. |
| UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/2630 |
Archive Staff Only
 |
View Item |
