Dokumaci, E.;
Lahkar, R.;
Sandholm, W.H.;
(2007)
The projection dynamic, the replicator dynamic and the geometry of population games.
(ELSE Working Papers
271).
ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution: London, UK.
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Abstract
Every population game defines a vector field on the set of strategy distributions X. The projection dynamic maps each population game to a new vector field: namely, the one closest to the payoff vector field among those that never point outward from X. We investigate the geometric underpinnings of the projection dynamic, describe its basic game-theoretic properties, and establish a number of close connections between the projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | The projection dynamic, the replicator dynamic and the geometry of population games |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | http://else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/newweb/papers.php#2007 |
| Language: | English |
| URI: | https://discovery-pp.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/14428 |
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